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OHIO'S "SACRED SEAL OF SECRECY": THE RULES OF




To secure domestic tranquility, it is necessary that the highest confidence
should exist between husband and wife; that all communications made in
confidence, by the disclosure of which either party may be affected,
should be considered as under the most sacred seal of secrecy. Ohio
Supreme Court, 1849.'
INTRODUCTION
A man stood accused of bludgeoning his twenty-two year old stepson to
death. His wife testified that on the morning of September 12, 1983, she was
riding in the car alone with her husband when he became enraged at her son in
the belief that the son had stolen the family food stamps. In the grip of anger,
the defendant "acted like a crazy man," "drove the car erratically," and "used
vile language when referring to the victim."2 The wife went to work, and the
husband returned home and locked the house from the inside, preventing his
wife and the other children from entering until early evening. Sometime during
the day the stepson was beaten and stabbed to death in his bed, extensive
bloodstains in the bedroom were cleaned up, and the corpse was dragged to the
basement, washed, and dressed in clean clothes. There were no eyewitnesses to
the crime. The body was discovered in the basement the next day. One block
away the defendant's blood-splattered shirt was found discarded.
The defendant was convicted of aggravated murder. The conviction was
reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court on the ground that the acts performed
and communications made by the defendant in the car with his wife were
"privileged," and were improperly admitted into evidence?
The decision of the Supreme Court was an accurate application of the
law. The rule of "marital privilege" 4 bars a wife from testifying about her hus-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law
'Cook v. Grange, 18 Ohio 526, 530 (1849).
'State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio St. 3d 146, 150, 492 N.E.2d 401, 406 (1986).
11d. at 150, 492 N.E.2d at 406.
'"Husband or wife shall not testify concerning a communication made by one to the other, or act done by
either in the presence of the other, during coverture, unless the communication was made or act done in the
known presence or hearing of a third person competent to be a witness, or in case of a personal injury by
either the husband or wife to the other,.. .or bigamy, or failure to provide for, or neglect or cruelty of either
to their children under eighteen years of age or their physically or mentally handicapped child under twenty-
one years of age, or neglect or abandonment of such spouse under such sections. The presence or
whereabouts of the husband or wife is not an act under this section. The rule is the same if the marital rela-
tion has ceased to exist." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
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band's confidential acts and communications. As in the foregoing case, the rule
of marital privilege can cause a miscarriage of justice. But a related rule, the
rule of "spousal incompetency"5 is even more unjust. In another Ohio case,6 a
woman was the only eyewitness when her husband murdered her mother. She
was not permitted to take the stand against her husband, because as his spouse
she was incompetent to testify.!
These are not isolated cases. There are other reported Ohio decisions
where criminal convictions have been reversed on the ground that the
testimony of the defendant's spouse was inadmissible as privileged or incompe-
tent.' No doubt there have been thousands of cases in Ohio where the pros-
ecuting attorney, mindful of the law, has not even attempted to call the defen-
dant's spouse as a witness, or has declined to prosecute because the defendant's
spouse was the only witness.
In addition to being an impediment to justice, these rules are sexist.
Although the rules of marital privilege and spousal incompetency are gender
neutral on their face, in practice they benefit men more than women. Eighty-
three percent of all crimes are committed by men; eighty-seven percent of all
crimes against the family are committed by men.9 Accordingly, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, the rules of marital privilege and spousal incompetency are
utilized to bar a wife from testifying against her husband. In only one reported
Ohio decision has a defendant wife attempted to interpose these rules against
her witness husband.'0 These rules are especially egregious in cases where a
wife desires to testify against her husband, such as where her husband has
murdered a member of her family.
It is time to change the law, and to abolish both the rule of marital
privilege and the rule of spousal incompetency." They should be replaced with
"'Every person is competent to be a witness except... [a] spouse testifying against the other spouse charged
with crimes except crimes against the testifying spouse or the children of either." OHIo R. EvID. 601(B).
'Locke v. State, 33 Ohio App. 445, 169 N.E. 833 (1929).
7The act occurred in the known presence of another person, namely the victim of the crime. Because the
defendant's action was not confidential, the defendant could not invoke the rule of marital privilege. The
defendant successfully interposed, however, an objection on the ground of his wife's incompetency to testify.
Id. at 450, 169 N.E. at 835.
'State v. Orth, 79 Ohio St. 130, 86 N.E. 476 (1908); Steen v. State, 20 Ohio St. 333 (1870); State v.
Rodriguez, 110 Ohio App. 307, 169 N.E. 2d 444 (1959); State v. Goodin, 60 Ohio App. 362, 21 N.E. 2d 482
(1938); Rosser v. State, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 69 (1931); and Dayton v. Patton, 24 Ohio Misc. 151, 259 N.E.2d
763 (1970).
9FBI Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, 1983. Men also commit eighty-three percent of violent
crimes and assaults.
'*This attempt was unsuccessful; the husband was permitted to testify because the wife was being prosecuted
for an assault upon her husband. Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio St. 87 (1877).
"There has been a gradual erosion over the years in the number of states allowing criminal defendants to
prevent their spouses from testifying. The first state to take away the power of the defendant to prevent a
spouse from testifying was Alabama. Section 5639 of the Alabama Code of 1923 provided:
The husband and wife may testify either for or against each other in criminal cases, but shall not be
compelled so to do.
See McKoy v. State, 221 Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930), applying the statute. General surveys of state law on
[Vol. 20:3
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SPOUSAL INCOMPETENCY AND MARITAL PRIVILEGE
a single rule of spousal testimonial immunity, which would provide:
No person shall be compelled to testify against his or her spouse in a
criminal case, except in cases of crimes against the testifying spouse or the
children of either.
In the remainder of this essay the rules of spousal incompetency and
marital privilege are compared and contrasted, the history of the rules in Ohio
is traced, the underlying justifications for the rules are discussed, and a pitch is
made for repeal of both rules, substituting the single rule of spousal immunity
described above.
THE RULE OF SPOUSAL INCOMPETENCY CONTRASTED TO THE RULE OF MARITAL
PRIVILEGE
The rule of spousal incompetency 2 bars one spouse from testifying
against the other spouse in a criminal proceeding, whether or not the events
which would be testified to were confidential, and whether or not they oc-
curred prior to or during the marriage. The only requirement for application of
the rule is that the witness and the defendant must be legally married at the
time of trial. In short, in Ohio a person can commit a crime, then marry the
witness, to keep the witness from testifying. 3
By contrast, the rule of marital privilege 4 bars a spouse or a former spouse
from divulging confidential information learned during the marriage, in a
civil" or criminal proceeding where the other spouse is a party. It matters not,
for purposes of applying the rule of marital privilege, whether the spouses are
legally married at the time of the trial.
The rule of spousal incompetency is inapplicable in cases involving
"crimes against the testifying spouse or the children of either."' 6 The rule of
marital privilege is inapplicable in a laundry list of crimes including prosecu-
tions for personal injury, bigamy, cruelty to, neglect of, or abandonment of the
testifying spouse, and cruelty to, neglect of, or failure to provide for their
this subject may be found in I GREENLEAFON EVIDENCE 472-479, § 334, fn. a (15th Ed., 1892); Note, 38 VA.
L. REV. 359 (1952); and Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n. 9 (1980).
The drafters of the 1942 Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence favored aboli-
tion of the rule of spousal incompetency and retention of the rule of marital privilege. MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE Rule 215 (1942); UNIF. R. EVID. 23(2) (1953).
"Supra note 5.
"This trial tactic worked in Dayton v. Patton, 24 Ohio Misc. 151, 259 N.E. 2d 763 (1970). See generally An-
not., 13 A.L.R. 4th 1305.
"Supra note 4.
"The rule of marital privilege for civil proceedings is codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (D)
(Baldwin 1984), the text of which is set forth in note 24, infra. The application of the rule of marital privilege
in civil cases is not addressed in this essay. I believe, however, that if the privilege is retained in civil cases the
option to exercise it ought to be with the witness spouse.
"OHIO R. EVID. 601(B), note 5 supra.
Winter, 1987]
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minor children. 7
In criminal cases the rule of marital privilege is almost entirely subsumed
within the rule of spousal incompetency. The only possible separate applica-
tions of the marital privilege rule are in cases where the witness is divorced
from the defendant spouse at the time of trial, and in cases where the victim of
the crime is the adult child of one of the parties." In such cases, the rule of
spousal incompetency does not apply, but the rule of marital privilege would
bar testimony concerning confidential marital acts and communications.
The rules of marital privilege and spousal incompetency have an impor-
tant characteristic in common. Under existing Ohio law, the option to invoke
these rules rests with the defendant spouse. The witness spouse has no discre-
tion in the matter.
HISTORY IN OHIO
Civil Cases
The Ohio Supreme Court first recognized a rule excluding spousal
testimony in 1849, in the civil case of Cook v. Grange.20 In 1853, the
legislature for the first time codified the rules of spousal incompetency and
marital privilege2' as part of the Code of Civil Procedure:
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: *** Husband and
wife, for or against each other, or concerning any communication made
by one to the other during the marriage, whether called as a witness while
that relation subsisted or afterward.
22
In 1870, the rule of spousal incompetency was deleted from the civil law,
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42, note 4 supra. As noted in the text, the rule of marital privilege is inap-
plicable in cases involving neglect or abuse of "their children." In State v. White, 116 Ohio App. 522, 189
N.E. 2d 160 (1962), it was argued by the defendant husband that he ought to be able to bar his wife from
testifying against him in a prosecution for "child stealing" his stepson, because this was not a crime involving
"their children" within the meaning of § 2945.42. The court interpreted the term "their children" as meaning
"his or her child or children." 116 Ohio App. at 526, 189 N.E.2d at 163.
"That was the situation in State v. Rahman, note 2 supra, where the defendant was accused of killing his
adult stepson. The rule of spousal incompetency was inapplicable because the crime was committed against
"the children of either." OHIO R. EvID. 601(B). But the rule of marital privilege was available to the defen-
dant because it was not an offense against a minor child of the defendant or his wife. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.42.
"Of course, if counsel forgets to object on the ground of spousal incompetency when the witness spouse
begins to testify, the objection is waived. Ruch v. State, 11I Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 75 (1924). If this occurs,
the defendant may be relegated to the marital privilege rule to exclude testimony of the witness spouse. State
v. Alexander, No. 39783, Slip Op. at 3-4 (8th Dist. Ct. App., Dec. 13, 1979) (Unreported decision); Locke v.
State, 33 Ohio App. 445, 169 N.E. 833 (1929) (dicta).
"18 Ohio 526 (1849).
"1853 also marked the first time that the marital privilege for confidential communications was codified in
Britain, in the EVIDENCE AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1853, St. 16 and 17 Vict. c. 83, § 3.
"Section 314, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1853), at 51 Ohio Laws 108-109. It also provided that persons of
unsound mind and children under ten incapable of receiving just impressions or relating them truly were in-
competent to testify, as well as attorneys and clergymen with respect to confidential communications.
[Vol. 20:3
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but the rule of marital privilege was retained.23 From that date forward hus-
band and wife have been competent to testify for and against each other in
civil cases, but may be prohibited from divulging confidential matters. The rule
of marital privilege adopted in 1870 is substantially similar to the rule in effect
today in civil cases, codified at Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.02(D).2
Criminal Cases
In 1869, the Ohio legislature adopted a Code of Criminal Procedure
which made no mention of the spousal exclusionary rules.21 And in 1870, the
legislature abolished the rule of spousal incompetency in civil cases.2 Never-
theless, in 1870, in the case of Steen v. State,27 the Ohio Supreme Court for the
first time held that "[hiusband and wife are not competent witnesses for or
against each other in criminal prosecutions.12 The court cited no precedent or
authority of any kind in support of its ruling, other than to say that the spousal
incompetency rule "is founded upon considerations of public policy9
29
In 1889 the legislature enacted a statute codifying the marital privilege
rule in criminal cases, but it repealed in part the doctrine of spousal in-
competency recognized in Steen v. State. The statute provided:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal prosecution by
reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise, or
by reason of his conviction of any crime; and husband and wife shall be
competent witnesses to testify on behalf of each other in all criminal pros-
ecutions; but husband or wife shall not testify concerning any communi-
cation made by one to the other, or act done by either, in the presence of
each other during coverture unless the communication was made, or act
done in the known presence or hearing of a third person competent to be a
witness or unless in case of personal injury by either the husband or wife
"11870 OHIo LAWS 111, 113-14. The rule of marital privilege was later codified at REV. STAT. 5241 and GEN.
CODE 11494. As noted in the text, it is presently codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (Baldwin
1984).
14The rule adopted in 1870 stated:
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: *** Husband or wife concerning any com-
munication made by one to the other during coverture, or any act done by either in the presence of
the other during coverture, unless such communication was made or such act was done, within the
known presence, hearing, or knowledge of a third person competent of being a witness, whether the
husband or wife be called as a witness while that relation subsists or afterwards.
The law presently provides:
The following persons shall not testify in certan respects: *** Husband or wife, concerning any com-
munication made by one to the other, or an act done by either in the presence of the other during co-
verture, unless the communication was made, or act done, in the known presence or hearing of a third
person competent to be a witness; and such rule is the same if the marital relation has ceased to exist ....
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (Baldwin, 1984).
"66 OHIO LAWS 287, 308.
"See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
r20 Ohio St. 333 (1870).
"Id.
"id. at 334 (emphasis in original).
Winter, 19871
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to the other; and the rule shall be the same if the marital relation has ceased
to exist; provided that the presence of whereabouts of the husband or wife
shall not be construed to be an act under this section.
30
This statute had three functions. First, it eliminated the common law dis-
qualification of witnesses who had an interest in the case, and of witnesses who
had been convicted of a crime." Second, it expressly made husbands and wives
competent to testify on behalf of each other. Third, it codified the rule of
marital privilege in criminal cases in substantially its present form."
The 1889 statute did not expressly provide that spouses were incompetent
to testify against each other in criminal cases. Thus, following the adoption of
this statute, the question inevitably arose whether the common law rule of in-
competency still obtained. Would the Ohio courts, in light of the failure of the
legislature to affirmatively adopt a rule of spousal incompetency, find that
husbands and wives could be called as witnesses against each other?
This question was answered in 1908 in the case of State v. Orth.13 The
husband in that case was being prosecuted for child neglect. The court ruled
that the statute of 1889, insofar as it allowed husbands and wives to testify for
each other in criminal cases, was in derogation of the common law, and ought
to be strictly construed. The court refused to permit Mrs. Orth to testify
against her husband, noting that it was for the legislature, not the court, to
change the law. 4 In the following year, the legislature responded by amending
the statute to expressly provide that the rule of spousal incompetency may not
be invoked in prosecutions for cruelty to, neglect of, or failure to support one's
children .
35
There the law stood for seventy years. In a single statute (Ohio Revised
Code Section 2945.42) the rule of marital privilege was expressly stated, and
111889 OHIO LAWS 161 (1889).
"Disqualification for interest had been previously abrogated in the CRIMINAL CODE OF 1869. 1869 OHIo
LAWS 287, 308. The act of 1889 reenacted that rule.
"The only changes which have been made in the rule of marital privilege since 1889 are that a number of ex-
ceptions have been created. In addition to cases of "personal injury by either husband or wife to the other,"
the rule of marital privilege is also inapplicable in cases of bigamy, neglect, or abandonment of a spouse, and
neglect of or cruelty to their children under eighteen years of age and handicapped children under twenty-
one years of age. Compare the original marital privilege as quoted in the text accompanying note 30 supra
with the present rule set forth in note 4, supra.
"'79 Ohio St. 130, 86 N.E. 476 (1908).
"4The Court stated:
If it had been the purpose and design of the Legislature to so relax or change this rule of the common
law as to permit husband and wife to testify against each other in the cases in said statute specified, it
would doubtless have so declared in express and appropriate terms, and it would not have left this pur-
pose to be ascertained or discovered, by interpretation, or supplied by mere conjecture. With the
policy of the rule that makes the wife incompetent as a witness against her husband in the present
case, we are not now concerned. If the law should be changed in this behalf, so as to make husband
and wife competent witnesses against each other in such cases the duty of changing it devolves upon
the legislature, not upon this court. Id. at 135-36, 86 N.E. at 478.
"I 909 OHIO LAWS 49, 49-50.
[Vol. 20:3
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss3/4
SPOUSAL INCOMPETENCY AND MARITAL PRIVILEGE
the rule of spousal incompetency was implicitly recognized. Then, in 1980, the
General Assembly and Supreme Court of the State of Ohio wasted a unique
opportunity to jettison the spousal exclusionary rules. The Ohio Supreme
Court was to draft (subject to the disapproval of the General Assembly) Rules
of Evidence.36 These rules of evidence would implicitly repeal any inconsistent
laws. Thus, the Court and General Assembly could have abolished the spousal
exclusionary rules." Instead, the Rules defer to statutory law for definition of
the evidentiary privileges, 8 and expressly incorporate a rule of spousal incom-
petency.39
Accordingly, that portion of Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.42 which
defines the rule of marital privilege is still the law. That portion of Ohio Re-
vised Code Section 2945.42 which implied a rule of spousal incompetency has
been repealed and replaced by the express incompetency rule of Evidence Rule
601(B).
Judicial Reluctance to Enforce the Spousal Exclusionary Rules
Despite the incorporation of the spousal exclusionary rules into our writ-
ten law, and despite the clarity of their provisions, Ohio courts have fashioned
a variety of "exceptions" so as to avoid applying them.
In State v. Mowery,4 the Ohio Supreme Court was presented with a
defendant who had shot his wife and his wife's lover. Mrs. Mowery survived,
but her boyfriend did not. Under the law, Mrs. Mowery should have been con-
sidered competent to testify against her husband on the charge of attempting
to murder her, but incompetent to testify on the charge of murdering her
boyfriend. Evidence Rule 60 1(B) provides that a spouse is competent to testify
against a spouse only where the defendant is charged with "crimes against the
testifying spouse or the children of either." There is no exception in the Rule
which would allow a spouse to testify about other crimes committed "as part of
one continuous transaction" with crimes against the testifying spouse. But the
.Rule-making power is vested in both the Supreme Court and the General Assembly, pursuant to OHIo
CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) provides:
The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state,
which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. *** Such rules shall take effect
on the following first day of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect.
"Congress had a similar opportunity to abolish the spousal exclusionary rules in the 1970's, when the
Federal Rules of Evidence were under consideration. As originally proposed, Evidence Rule 505 would have
eliminated the marital privilege, although it would have retained the rule of spousal incompetency. But Con-
gress refused to adopt the proposed rules of evidence dealing with privileges, leaving their continued develop-
ment to the courts. FED. R. EVID. 501 (effective 1975). See Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives: A
Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 1353 (1973).
"OHIo R. EVID. 501.
"OHIO R. Ev[D. 601(B).
101 Ohio St. 3d 192.
Winter, 19871
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Ohio Supreme Court adopted such an exception,"' because application of the
spousal incompetency rule seemed so unjust.'
2
Another judicial exception to the spousal exclusionary rules is one for
unhappy marriages. Some courts have permitted spouses to testify in cases
where the couple is estranged.43 This places the court in the dubious position of
deciding which marriages are worth preserving and which are not."
A common error of Ohio courts is to confuse the relatively strict re-
quirements of the marital privilege rule as being necessary for application of
the spousal incompetency rule. For example, courts have stated that a wife
may testify in any case where the events testified to occurred in the known
presence of a third person.'5 This is incorrect. Under Evidence Rule 601(B), a
witness spouse is incompetent to testify to any matters, privileged or not. This
error must be attributed to the understandable desire of the courts to permit
the jury to hear all relevant evidence. 6
"Chief Justice Celebrezze dissented on the ground that the Court ought not to arrogate to itself the power to
rewrite statutory law:
If the rule on spousal incompetency should be eliminated - as I think it should be - then the majori-
ty's ad hoc amendment of the rule, under the guise of judicial review, is not the legally appropriate
mechanism by which to reform Ohio law on this point. Rather, pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of
the Ohio Constitution, this court, under its constitutional rulemaking authority, should redraft Evid.
R. 601(B) and submit it to the General Assembly.
1 Ohio St. 3d at 202, 438 N.E.2d at 905 (footnote omitted).
'2Mowery was followed in State v. Fewerwerker, 24 Ohio App. 3d 27, 492 N.E.2d 8B (1985). Fewerwerker
was charged with aggravated murder of his father-in-law and felonious assault upon his wife. His wife was
permitted to testify against him because both crimes were committed as part of one continuous transaction.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of the State of Ohio has taken this exception to an extreme.
In State v. Bristow, No. 42576, Slip Op. at 8-9 (Aug. 6, 1981), the court permitted a wife to testify against her
husband, in the prosecution of him for the murder of her lover. Mr. Bristow had been charged with en-
dangering his child in the same criminal episode, but the endangering charge was dropped at trial. Never-
theless, the trial court permitted the wife to testify against her husband on the murder charge, and the ap-
pellate court affirmed.
The first court to adopt the "single criminal episode" exception to the spousal exclusionary rules was the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969). See generally Annot., 36
A.L.R. 3d 820.
"1State v. Bradley, No. 50220 (Cuy. Co. Ct. App., Feb. 19, 1986); State v. Canitia, No. 46946 (Cuy. Co. Ct.
App., Jan. 19, 1984); Bristow, No. 42576 (Pryatel, J., concurring). See United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d
752 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Annot. 98 A.L.R. 3d 1285.
"Jeffrey Eugene Jones believes that courts are capable of making this determination:
In evaluating whether a marriage is worth preserving, courts should consider when the couple mar-
ried, whether the spouses have cohabited for an insubstantial period of time since marriage, and
whether one spouse has threatened the other spouse not to testify.
Note, Federal Marital Privileges in a Criminal Context: The Needfor Further Modification Since Trammel, 43
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197, 220 (1986).
In agreement with Mr. Jones is Note The Joint Participation Exception to the Marital Testimonial Privilege:
Balancing the Interests "In Light of Reason and Experience, " 19 IND. L. REV. 645, 662 (1986).
'5Mowery, 1 Ohio St. 3rd at 199, 438 N.E.2d at 901 (1983) (dicta); State v. Stevenson, No. 40725, Slip Op. at 4-5
(8th Dist. Ct. App., June 19, 1980).
*Judge Pryatel of the Eighth District Court of Appeals made the following argument in favor of allowing
spousal testimony:
If the victim were wounded by the assailant in the presence of his Ithe assailant's] wife, he would be
subject to prosecution by the victim, but when the victim is slain by his assailant in the presence of his
wife, are we to annoint him with immunity? I hope not.
Bristow, No. 42576, (Pryatel, J., concurring).
[Vol. 20:3
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Finally, Ohio judges have found the admission of spousal testimony to be
harmless error, even in cases where the spouse was the only eyewitness to the
crime, 7 and in cases where the spouse offered highly persuasive testimony
against the defendant."
The federal courts have fashioned another exception to the spousal exclu-
sionary rules: the "joint participation" exception. Under this doctrine, the
spousal exclusionary rules do not apply in any case where the spouses are joint
participants in a crime.49 This exception has not been applied in any reported
Ohio decision.
Summary
In view of the lengths to which the Ohio courts have gone in order to
avoid applying the spousal exclusionary rules, it is appropriate to ask whether
the rules ought not to be repealed altogether.
The year 1980 marked the first time in the history of Ohio jurisprudence
that the rule of spousal incompetency was affirmatively recognized by the
legislature. It is therefore no longer possible to reform the rule of spousal in-
competency through a court decision. Evidence Rule 601(B), embodying the
spousal incompetency rule, and Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.42, codifying
the rule of marital privilege, will have to be amended.
In deciding whether to amend or repeal the spousal exlusionary rules, it is
appropriate to consider the purposes served by the rules. The following section
of this article explores the underlying policy considerations.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Insofar as the spousal exclusionary rules exclude relevant evidence from
consideration by the trier of fact, they impede the ability of the trier of fact to
determine the truth. The two guiding principles of the law of evidence as for-
mulated by James Thayer are: "(1) [T]hat nothing is to be received which is not
logically probative of some matter requiring to be proved; and (2) that
everything which is thus probative should come in, unless a clear ground of
policy or law excludes it.""
These principles are codified in Rule 402 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence,
which states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by [law]. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
"Id. at 9-10.
"State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio St. 3d 146, 157-63, 492 N.E.2d 401, 41 1-16 (1986) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"The "joint participation" exception is criticized in Note, Partners in Crime: The Joint Participants Excep-
tion to the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony. 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019 (1985).
"J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW (1898), at 264, quoted in James,
Relevancy, Probability, and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689 (1941).
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Furthermore, it is a fundamental tenet of the law of evidence that the
evidentiary privileges are to be strictly construed. Wigmore phrased the princi-
ple as follows:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamen-
tal maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke)
has a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the
various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that
there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and
that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule."
Thus relevant evidence is to be admitted, and the public is entitled to
every man's and woman's evidence. Is there a "clear ground of policy or law",
or a "distinctly exceptional" reason which favors exclusion of a spouse's rele-
vant testimony?
There are four arguments that have been offered by courts and commen-
tators in support of the spousal exclusionary rules:
(1) Husband and wife are legally one person;
(2) A defendant's spouse is an unreliable witness;
(3) We are protecting the institution of marriage generally and the mar-
riage of the defendant and the witness specifically; and
(4) We are protecting the privacy of the defendant.
Each of these justifications is examined below.
The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife
The rule that husbands and wives could not testify against each other was
recognized in English common law,5" but the rule of marital privilege was de-
veloped in the 19th century on the recommendation of legal commentators. 3
5"WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2192 (3rd Ed.), quoted in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), reh'gde-
nied, 339 U.S. 991. Wigmore's thesis was paraphrased by Chief Justice Warren Burger in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974):
Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly cre-
ated nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.
2The first recorded reference to the rule is in Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580), wherein the court
without explanation ordered a wife's testimony against her husband to be "suppressed." In The Lady Ivy's
Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 555, 644 (K.B. 1684), the court stated:
But by the law the husband cannot be a witness against his wife, nor a wife against her husband, to
charge them with anything criminal, except only in cases of high treason. This is so known a common
rule, that I thought it could never have borne any question or debate.
3The rule of marital privilege was first codified in England by the EVIDENCE AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1853,
supra note 21. In researching the history of the rule of marital privilege before 1853, Sir Wilfred Greene of
the English Court of Appeals made a surprising discovery:
The authorities and text-books which I have examined in the course of this judgment are all earlier in
date than the Act of 1853. I must confess to feeling some surprise at the result of that examination;
since the existence of the alleged rule of common law has, I think, in modern times been assumed by
many lawyers. It is not without significance that the only English text-book earlier in date than the
Act of 1853 in which the existence of the alleged rule is asserted is the First Edition of Best on
[Vol. 20:3
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaex hange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/v l20/iss3/4
SPOUSAL INCOMPETENCY AND MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Sir Edward Coke expanded the scope of the spousal exclusionary rules by
declaring that spouses were also incompetent to testify in favor ofeach other.5"
Coke explained that husband and wife are "duae animae in came una" [two
souls in one body]."
A century later Blackstone still acknowledged the mystical unity of hus-
band and wife as forbidding either spouse from testifying for or against the
other:
But, in trials of any sort, they are not allowed to be evidence for, or
against, each other: partly because it is impossible their testimony should
be indifferent; but principally because of the union of person: and
therefore, if they were admitted to be witnessesfor each other, they would
contradict one maxim of law, "nemo in propria causa testis esse debet"
[no-one ought to be a witness in his own cause]; and if against each other,
they would contradict another maxim, "nemo tenetur seipsum accusare
[no-one is bound to accuse himself]." 56
The "legal unity" of husband and wife was an ethereal, even romantic
scrim drawn over a patriarchial stage. The legal fiction masked a reality of
domination. The Ohio Supreme Court in 1870 described this unity not as two
equals coming together; it stated, rather, "that the legal existence of the wife is
merged in that of the husband, so that, in law, the husband and wife are one
person."" The court went on to describe the legal status of a married woman:
The husband's dominion over the person and property of the wife is fully
recognized. She is utterly incompetent to contract in her own name. He is
entitled to her society and her service; to her obedience and her property.
All her personal chattels are absolutely his, and her choses in action when
reduced to his possession, and the right to so reduce them at his will and
pleasure. He has an unqualified right to the use of her realty during cover-
ture, and an estate for life, in the event of her death, if she bear him a
child born alive .... 5
Evidence, . . . where the only authority cited is the American work of Professor Greenleaf.
Shenton v. Tyler, 1939 Law Rep. 620, 636 (Ch. Div. 1938). See also Guarnieri, Husband- Wife Privileged
Communications, Summarized, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 531 n. 5 (1959), quoting the above passage.
Best and Greenleaf are quoted in note 63 infra and the accompanying text, voicing reasons in favor of ex-
cluding spousal testimony.
"I1 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, § 6b (1628). That Coke was unable to cite precedent
in support of this conclusion is not surprising. "The fact is that Lord Coke had no authority for what he
states, but I am afraid we should get rid of a great deal of what is considered law in Westminster Hall if what
Lord Coke says without authority is not law." Best, C.J., quoted in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 954
(1950).
"Coke, note 52 supra, § 6b. This must have been hilarious to Coke's contemporaries. Coke and his estranged
wife Lady Hackett had been the subjects of popular gossip for decades as they waged battle in the streets, the
courts, and Privy Council. CATHERINE DRINKER BROWN, THE LION AND THE THRONE, 393-411 (1957).
11 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Ch. 15, at 443 (1765) (emphasis in original).
"Phillips v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 371, 380 (1870).
"Id. See also the discussion of the doctrine of the legal unity of husband and wife in this context in Mowery,
1 Ohio St. 3d at 193-94, 438 N.E. 2d at 898-99.
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Four years later, in 1874, the Married Women's Acts 9 repealed most of
the common law disabilities. However, the wifely duty of obedience was recog-
nized by Ohio statutory law until recently. Former Ohio Revised Code Section
3103.02 provided that the husband was the "head of the household", and em-
powered him to choose the family's place of domicile. It was repealed in 1974.
At least since 1974, therefore, it is safe to say that Ohio does not conceive
marriage as a hierarchial state. As husbands' legal power over wives disap-
peared, so vanished the legal unity with their wives. And, in fact, the supposed
unity of spouses has never been offered by the Ohio courts as a justification for
the spousal exclusionary rules. So let us proceed to the other proferred reasons
for the rules.
The Unreliability of a Spouse's Testimony
An ancient function of the law of evidence was to bar the testimony of
classes of persons who would have a motive to lie. Parties, convicted criminals,
and any person with an interest in the proceeding, were all deemed incompe-
tent to testify.60 In such a system it was perfectly reasonable to bar a defen-
dant's wife from testifying.
But the disqualification of parties and persons with an interest in the pro-
ceeding was repealed in Ohio over a century ago. 6' The central premise of the
contemporary law of evidence is that the trier of fact weighs the credibility of
witnesses; it is not for the court to exclude classes of witnesses on the ground
that their testimony is not to be trusted.62 The supposed unreliability of a
spouse's testimony has never been offered by the Ohio courts as a primary
reason for excluding it.
63
The Protection of the Institution of Marriage and of the Marriage of the
Defendant and the Witness
In the eighteenth century, courts began to offer an alternative explana-
"71 OHIO LAWS 47, § 28, now codified at OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3103.04, 3103.05, 3103.07, 3103.08, and
2307.09 (Baldwin, 1953).
61It seems anomolous that a society which purported to put such great faith in the efficacy of the witness'
oath to tell the truth should attempt to bar all persons with the least interest in the case from testifying. But
let us judge not, lest we be judged.
"1Disqualification for interest was abrogated in 1850 with the enactment of the "Statute to Improve the Law
of Evidence." 48 OHIO LAWS 33. This law did retain the rule that parties and persons for whom an action
were bought were incompetent to testify.
In 1853 the legislature adopted a CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 51 OHIO LAWS 108. Section 310 provided:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness, in any civil action or proceeding, by reason of his interest
in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of a crime; but such in-
terest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility.
Disqualification for interest was abolished in criminal cases in 1869. See supra note 31.
"This is the import of Thayer's two "guiding principles," quoted in the text accompanying note 50 supra.
'"But see the statement of the Supreme Court disapproving of the testimony of a divorced spouse in Cook v.
Grange, in the text accompanying note 69, infra. See also Blackstone's passing reference to this matter in the
text accompanying note 56 supra, that "it is impossible their [spousesi testimony should be indifferent."
[Vol. 20:3
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tion for barring spousal testimony. In Lord Hardwicke's words: "The reason
why the law will not suffer a wife to be a witness for or against her husband is,
to preserve the peace of families." '64
In the nineteenth century, commentators and jurists universally ac-
claimed the spousal exclusionary rules as "pro-family." Professor Greenleaf, a
leading American authority on the law of evidence, wrote in 1866:
The rule, by which parties are excluded from being witnesses for
themselves, applies to the case of husband and wife; neither of them being
admissible as a witness in a cause, civil or criminal, in which the other is a
party. This exclusion is founded partly on the identity of their legal rights
and interests, and partly on principles of public policy, which lie at the
basis of civil society. For it is essential to the happiness of social life, that
the confidence subsisting between husband and wife should be sacredly
protected and cherished in its most unlimited extent; and to break down
or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of that relation
would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.65
But surely only a person wholly unacquainted with the state of holy
matrimony would consider repeal of the spousal incompetency rules to con-
tribute to the breakdown of the family. Consider the morbidly humorous argu-
ment of Alvin Wickline, summarized by the court in Wickline's action for a
writ of habeas corpus, based upon the ground that his wife had testified against
him: "Wickline says that he killed Mrs. Wickline's father after a quarrel. He
says further that the hostility between himself and Mrs. Wickline, already in-
tense, was made even more acute by the killing of his father-in-law and that
Mrs. Wickline has since divorced him."66
Such a killing might put a strain upon even a happy marriage, might it
not? The justification for allowing Mr. Wickline to assert the rules of marital
privilege and spousal incompetency is that his marriage and other marriages
will be strengthened if Mrs. Wickline is prevented from testifying against
him. 7 In Wigmore's words, "[Ilt is a reason which is never allowed in practice
"Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (King's Bench 1736).
" GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE 389, § 334 (1866) (footnotes omitted).
According to Best, a leading British commentator, the spousal exclusionary rules prevent "implacable dis-
sension":
The other persons affected by this rule of exclusion, were the husbands and wives of the parties to the
suit or proceeding. Husband and wife, say our books, "sunt duae animae in came una" (t)hey "are
considered as one and the same person in law, and to have the same affections and interests; from
whence it has been established as a general rule, that the husband cannot be a witness for or against
the wife, nor the wife be a witness for or against the husband, by reason of the implacable dissension
which might be caused by it, and the great danger of perjury from taking the oaths of persons under
so great a bias, and the extreme hardship of the case.
BEST ON EVIDENCE 270-271, § 175 (1878) (footnotes omitted).
"Wickline v. Alvis, 103 Ohio App. 1, 1-2 144 N.E. 2d 207, 208 (1957).
In Wickline the petitioner claimed he should be released from confinement because his wife had offered
testimony against him in the grand jury proceedings. The court denied his petition on the ground that a
prisoner cannot collaterally attack the legality or sufficiency of the evidence used to indict him. Id., 103 Ohio
Winter, 19871
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to be logically applied."68
In only one Ohio case was the protection of the institution of marriage of-
fered as a justification for barring a wife's testimony. In 1849, the Ohio
Supreme Court suggested that allowing a divorced spouse to testify would en-
courage divorces! "The frequency of divorces at the present time, is a matter
... not to be overlooked. If either husband or wife could be made a witness
against the other, as soon as divorce was obtained, it might, in some instances,
have a tendency to produce that result." 9
The court's objection may be answered, of course, by permitting a spouse
to testify against the other during the marriage, making divorce unnecessary.
Under present law, a divorced spouse is competent to testify as to all matters
which are not privileged.
Accordingly, this reason, the preservation of marriages, is neither logical
nor has it been substantially relied upon by Ohio courts as a justification for
the spousal exclusionary rules.7" We now turn to the primary policy which the
Ohio courts have declared that they are serving by barring spousal testimony:
the policy of protecting the privacy of the defendant.
The Privacy Interest of the Defendant
This is at once the most plausible and the most cynical of the reasons of-
ferred in support of the spousal exclusionary rules. Its premise is that a person
may reasonably expect that confidences shared with a spouse should remain
secret.
In order to explore the soundness of this reason it is necessary to examine
the earliest Ohio cases barring spousal testimony, where the justification was
extensively relied upon.
The first cases in Ohio to apply the rules of spousal incompetency and
marital privilege were civil cases. These were Cook v. Grange, 71 Stober v. Mc-
Carter," and Bird v. Hueston."1 These early authorities did not clearly
distinguish between spousal incompetency and marital privilege. These con-
App. at 9-10, 144 N.E. 2d at 213. The Court of Appeals for Summit County reached the same result without
citing Wickline in State v. Muenick, 26 Ohio App. 3d 3, 498 N.E. 2d 171 (1985).
684 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE 3039-3040 (1st Ed. 1904, 1905).
"Cook v. Grange, 18 Ohio 526, 530 (1849). A detailed discussion of Cook v. Grange is contained in the text
accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
"The preservation of marital harmony was the primary justification for the doctrine of spousal immunity
under the law of tort. See Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965). Interspousal immunity
was abolished by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E. 2d
388 (1985).
"118 Ohio 526.
724 Ohio St. 513.
"10 Ohio St. 418.
[Vol. 20:3
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cepts were vaguely perceived as different aspects of the same exclusionary rule.
In Cook v. Grange, the first decision of the Ohio Supreme Court on this
subject, 4 the Supreme Court forbade a divorced wife from taking the stand,
even though her husband was not a party to the lawsuit. The facts were that in
1837, Cook leased his farm to Thomas Grange and William Gaily. Grange left
the premises in 1838, Gaily in 1840. Cook sued Grange for unpaid rent.
Neither Cook nor Grange were competent to testify under the common
law rule disqualifying parties from taking the stand. What evidence did they
adduce?
For his case in chief, Cook introduced the lease, and proved that Grange
had taken possession under it. In defense, Grange called Sarah Gaily, who had
been divorced from William Gaily in 1846. She testified that in November of
1837, Cook, Grange, and Gaily met at the farm and agreed that Grange
should be released from his obligation on the lease, and that Gaily should be
solely liable for payment of rent. Her testimony was the sole evidence of the
parol agreement.
Grange prevailed in Common Pleas Court on the strength of Sarah
Gaily's testimony. Cook appealed to the Supreme Court," asserting as error
that Mrs. Gaily was incompetent to be a witness.
The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Gaily was not a competent witness,
even though Mr. Gaily was not a party to the lawsuit, even though the events
described were not confidential, and even though she and Mr. Gaily were di-
vorced at the time of trial. Its principal reason was that it would be "highly dis-
honorable" for either spouse, after a divorce, to disclose facts learned "either
by confidential communication, or in any way on account of the marriage rela-
tion."7 6 Marriage impresses upon its participants "the most sacred seal of
secrecy.""
The "sacred seal of secrecy" was broken six year later in Stober v. McCar-
ter. During the intervening period the Ohio legislature had repealed the com-
mon law rules barring the testimony of parties and persons with an interest in
the proceeding,78 and codified the spousal exclusionary rules in civil cases."
"The Court noted:
The first and most important question that arises in this record is, whether Sarah Gaily was a compe-
tent witness to prove the facts testified to by her. This question comes before this court for the first
time.
18 Ohio 526 at 529.
"This was a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Intermediate appellate courts were not created until two
years later by the Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. IV, § 5.
"Cook, 18 Ohio at 530.
" Id.
"1See note 61 supra.
"See note 23 supra. and accompanying text.
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In Stober a workman, McCarter, had filed a claim against Stober's estate
for work performed. McCarter called Stober's widow to the stand to help prove
his claim. The Supreme Court held her testimony to be admissible on the
ground that it did not harm her late husband's reputation.
[A] widow, if not a competent witness to prove conversations with her
husband, is competent to prove other independent facts that occured dur-
ing the coverture, the statement of which by her violates no confidence,
nor is in anywise prejudicial to his reputation. * * * Catharine Stober
testified to no conversations at all, nor to anything the knowledge of
which, was derived through conjugal confidence, not to anything prej-
udicial to the reputation of her deceased husband.8 0
The Ohio Supreme Court saw the introduction of spousal testimony as
primarily an invasion of privacy. The purpose of the rules barring such
testimony is to prevent the disclosure of evidence "prejudicial to the reputa-
tion" of the husband. In support of this reasoning, the court cited the case of
Robin v. King, "an 1830 decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals, as an exam-
ple of a case where spousal testimony was inadmissible. It is a peculiarly ap-
propriate precedent for the spousal exclusionary rules.
Robin, a slave, sued his master for his freedom on the ground that he was
Indian, not Negro. As proof he offered the testimony of the widow of his for-
mer master, who stated that her late husband had told the family that Robin's
mother was Indian. The trial court excluded her testimony, and the Virginia
Court of Appeals affirmed, in large part because it would have reflected badly
on her husband for him to have held people in slavery unlawfully. The
Virginia court found it would have a "most mischievous effect" to allow such
testimony, for men's "reputation might be injured, and their children ruined,
by the declarations they had made in the bosoms of their families." 
8 2
The express reasoning of the Virginia Court of Appeals in this antebellum
emancipation case is identical to the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Stober v. McCarter. This reasoning is that it is disloyal for a man's family to of-
fer testimony which puts him in a poor light. Four years later the Ohio
Supreme Court again excluded a spouse's testimony, "in order to insure con-
"4 Ohio St., at 523 (emphasis in original omitted, new emphasis supplied).
1'29 Va. (2 Leigh) 140 (1830).
"The portions of the opinion cited in the text are taken from the following peroration by the court:
Are we to say, that every word spoken, in the thoughtless, careless confidence of the domestic circle,
is free for public disclosure, unless secrecy be expressly in joined? Is not the converse of the proposition
true? And would it not have a most mischievous effect, would it not seriously break in upon that con-
fidence which is the charm of domestic life, if men should, from our decisions, have cause to fear, that
after they were in their graves, their reputation might be injured, and their children ruined, by the
declarations they had made in the bosoms of their families? This freedom from restraint or apprehen-
sion, in the intercourse of one's own fireside, seems to me so necessary to the quiet and repose of socie-
ty, that I am fearful of trenching upon it in the slightest degree.
29 Va. (2 Leigh), at 144.
[Vol. 20:3
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jugal confidence"."
Wigmore ridiculed this justification of the spousal exclusionary rules. He
noted that testimony by a wife against her husband, in the eyes of the common
law, was tantamount to "testimonial betrayal," and reminiscent of the ancient
offense of petit treason - an act of violence on the head of the household. 4
This enforcable duty of a spouse to remain silent has surely passed with the du-
ty of obedience.
Every other evidentiary privilege is based upon a legal duty to keep cer-
tain information secret. Doctors, lawyers, and priests are legally and profes-
sionally bound to respect their oaths of confidentiality. 5 Husbands and wives
are under no such legal duty. They may proclaim a spouse's secrets to their
friends, to the media, even to the police. The only place that they may not state
what they know is in court, under oath. Clearly it is not "privacy," but control
over one's spouse, that is protected by these evidentiary rules.
"Privacy" is the main justification relied upon by the Ohio courts for the
rules barring spousal testimony. It grows out of a view of marriage as a pro-
pietary relationship. If one's view of marriage is that each spouse owns the
other, and has the legal right to control the other's behavior, then the spousal
exclusionary rules make perfect sense.
But this proprietary view of marriage is no longer an acceptable legal
model. A legal model of marriage which is consistent with contemporary
mores is described in the following section, where I also suggest how the
spousal exclusionary rules may be changed to conform to present values.
REFORM OF THE SPOUSAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES
None of the reasons offerred in support of the spousal exclusionary rules
is persuasive.86 Ohio courts have routinely found excuses for not enforcing the
rules.8 This is proof that these rules no longer reflect values held by society.
As noted above, the adoption of the Married Women's Acts, and the
repeal of the law recognizing the husband as the head of the household,
"Bird v. Hueston, 10 Ohio St. 418, 429 (1859).
34 WIGMORE 3035 (ist Ed., 1904, 1905).
"Moreover, the evidence excluded by the spousal exclusionary rules is far broader than information exclud-
ed by the privileges based upon the attorney-client, physician-patient, or clergyman-penitent relationships.
In Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is limited to communications "made to [the attorney] by his client in
that relation or his advice to this client." The physician-patient privilege is similarly limited to communica-
tions made or advice given "in that relation." The clergyman's privilege is restricted to "a confession made,
or any information confidentially communicated, to him for a religious counseling purpose in his profession-
al character." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2317.02(A), (B), and (C) (Baldwin 1984). The husband-wife privilege
and incompetency rules are not tied to any particular subject matter, and cover acts done as well as commu-
nications made.
"See POLICY CONSIDERATIONS section of this article.
'See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
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obliterated the common law disabilities of wives in Ohio.88 The duty of obe-
dience lives on, however, in the spousal exclusionary rules.89 Do current at-
titudes towards marriage permit one spouse to forbid another from testifying
in a criminal case?
No. Recent decades have seen women and men strive for legal and social
equality. Marriage is now commonly treated as a joining of equals. Strict gen-
der roles are discouraged. Freedom of choice, for both genders, is encouraged.
Perhaps the greatest impetus for change has been the assimilation of
women into the workforce.1 This has caused noteworthy changes in our fun-
damental law. It is now unconstitutional for the government to pay higher
benefits to a married man than to a married woman." It is unconstitutional for
a state to award alimony to wives and not husbands.92 The Supreme Court of
the United States has declared, "No longer is a female destined solely for the
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and
the world of ideas." 9
3
This freedom of choice extends not only to the allocation of economic and
child-rearing roles, but also to the very existence of the marriage relationship.
Until recently, a person could terminate a marriage only with cause, by prov-
ing that the other spouse had committed adultery, or had abandoned,
neglected or been cruel to the partner.94 Today, however, people may agree to
dissolve a marriage,95 or if they cannot agree, one spouse may unilaterally ob-
tain a divorce after a separation of one year." Marriage is no longer a legally
enforceable obligation. It is instead a voluntary undertaking. It is not a legal
duty owed to another; it is an act of will performed for another.
The theory that attitudes about marriage have evolved is supported by
sociological research. Forty years ago, the most common reason given by
women for divorcing their husbands was that their husbands had failed to sup-
port them. Today, the most common reason given by women who have ob-
"See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
"In abolishing the doctrine of sp5ousal immunity in tort, the Supreme Court noted:
When feudal concepts of a marital entity evolve to the modern concept of the marital partnership, it is
the court's duty to see that the law reflects the changing face of society.
Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 99, 480 N.E. 2d 388, 394 (1985).
'*At the turn of the century, only 18% of the working population was female. By 1984, women constituted
43% of the workforce. Over 50% of mothers with small children now work outside the home. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, set forth in THE 1986 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC at 57.
"Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
"Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), on remand, 374 So. 29, 895 (Ala. 1979), cert. denied, Ex parte Orr, 444
U.S. 1060 (1980).
"Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1974).
'4See Cannell, Abolish Fault-Oriented Divorce in Ohio - As a Service to Society and to Restore Dignity to
the Domestic Relations Courts, 4 AKRON L. REV. 92 (1971).
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tained a divorce is that they simply didn't like their husbands' personality.97
In recognition of freedom and equality in marriage Mahatma Ghandi
said: "The wife is not the husband's bondslave but his companion and his help-
mate and an equal partner in all his joys and sorrows - as free as the husband
to choose her own path."9
Modern theologians support this changing nature of marriage. Letty M.
Russell has written:
[Tihe teachings of Jesus and Paul on marriage and human relationships
are not necessarily inconsistent with much of what women and men are
seeking today through alternative methods of equal partnership. Men and
women who challenge the hypocrisy and destructiveness of many of our
marriage customs are neither causing the social dissolution of the nuclear
family nor necessarily contradicting God's intentions for human develop-
ment.99
It is clear that the spousal exclusionary rules in their present form are not
consistent with this contemporary model of marriage. Whatever rules are
adopted today must reflect our belief in equality and freedom of choice. Does
this mean that spousal testimony must be treated the same as evidence offered
by other witnesses, and should be compellable in all cases?
It has been suggested that the spousal exclusionary rules are based on con-
siderations of "sexuality and intimacy," and should be extended to all persons
who love the defendant: parents, children, lovers and intimate friends.)° But
only three states recognize a privilege between parent and child,'' and none
has adopted a privilege for lovers. 02 For it is not passion, or even love, which
justifies a rule allowing a spouse not to testify. Marriage differs from other
family relationships in that it is voluntarily entered and voluntarily ended. It
differs from friendship and love affairs in that it is always accompanied by an
'Kitson & Sussman, Marital Complaints, Demographic Characteristics, and Symptoms of Mental Distress
in Divorce, 87 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 95 (1982).
"THE WORDS OF GHANDI 21 (R. Attenborough ed. 1982).
"L. RUSSELL, THE FUTURE OF PARTNERSHIP, 94-95 (1979).
Leonard Swidler, Professor of Catholic Studies at Temple University, has offered a new interpretation of
the creation story based upon a reexamination of ancient texts. In his opinion, the original meaning was that
Adam and Eve were created from a sexually undifferentiated being ("humanity"), rather than woman being
fashioned from man. Interpreted in this way, the creation story "expresses the idea that it was not good for
humanity to be singular, that to be fully human there must be relationships, dialogue between two equals,
which function the lesser animals cannot fulfill." L. SWIDLER, BIBLICAL AFFIRMATIONS OF WOMAN. 75-78
(1979) (emphasis in original).
10Note, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1454, 1590 (1985).
111d. at 1575.
1021n an Ohio murder case, a woman was sentenced to six months in jail for refusing to testify against the
man with whom she lived and she claimed was her husband. The trial court found that they were not mar-
ried, and held the women in contempt of court. State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201, 400 N.E. 2d 386 (1980).
See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 422.
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express or an implied vow of loyalty, recognized by law. The true question is,
should a person be permitted to observe that vow of loyalty, by refusing to
testify at a spouse's trial?
The Supreme Court of the United States answered this question in the af-
firmative. In Trammel v. United States,13 the Court abandoned its rule of
spousal incompetency"° and adopted a rule of spousal testimonial immunity,
giving the witness spouse the option of deciding whether to testify against the
defendant."5 The Court reasoned: "When one spouse is willing to testify
against the other in a criminal proceeding - whatever the motivation - their
relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way
of marital harmony to preserve."'16
Eight decades ago Wigmore disagreed. He saw no reason to retain a rule
forbidding or excusing a spouse from testifying. 107 As for our "natural
repugnance" at forcing one spouse to testify against the other, he called it "not
more than a sentiment." He ascribed the rule to the "general spirit of sports-
manship" which pervades the adversary process, and stated that the rules owe
their existence to the opinion that "It]he expedient of convicting a man out of
the mouth of his own wife is... poor sport, and we shall not stoop to it." He
reminds us that litigation is not a game, and that we should not let sentiment
or a contrived notion of sportsmanship interfere with the search for truth.' 8
In my opinion the courts should not compel a person to testify against a
spouse. Remember the agony of Elizabeth Proctor, who had never told a lie,
compelled to testify against her husband at the climax of The Crucible.°9
There is something in the marriage relationship which transcends the right of
the state to "every man's evidence." This transcendent principle is not a right
in the defendant spouse to seal the lips of the witness with a betrothal kiss. In-
stead, it is the right of a witness to remain silent, observing a vow of loyalty to
his or her spouse. The choice to testify must rest with the witness spouse.
One remaining problem is to identify the cases in which a witness spouse
ought to be compelled to testify. Present law recognizes that spousal testimony
is compellable in cases of crimes against the testifying spouse or the children of
either. It is appropriate to continue these exceptions for the protection of the
103445 U.S. 40 (1980).
'*'Trammel modified Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), in which the Court had held that one
spouse may not testify against the other unless both consent.
"'For an extensive description of the Trammel decision, see Note, Evidentiary Privilege: Privilege of Defen-
dant to Prevent Adverse Spousal Testimony Abolished - Trammel v. United States, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV.
147 (1981).
210445 U.S. at 52. The court left intact the rule of marital privilege. Id. at 45, n. 5.
107Wigmore did, however, favor retention of the rule protecting confidential marital communications. 8 WIG-
MORE 642, § 2332 (1961 McNaughton Rev.).
'"4 WIGMORE 3040 (Ist Ed., 1904, 1905).
'0ARTHUR MILLER. THE CRUCIBLE, Act Ill.
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family." '°
Accordingly, the following rule of spousal testimonial immunity is pro-
posed, in place of the present rules of spousal incompetency and marital
privilege: "No person shall be compelled to testify against his or her spouse in a
criminal case, except in cases of crimes against the testifying spouse or the
children of either."
'10The Ohio Supreme Court has proposed in dicta that the spousal exclusionary rules should not be applied in
any cases involving crimes against children. State v. Mowery, I Ohio St. 3d 192, 194-5, n. I, 438 N.E. 2d
897, 899, n. I (1982). Those who favor broadening the number of cases in which a spouse may be compelled
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